MAJOR OPERATIONAL DECISIONS AND FREE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: ELIMINATING THE MANDATORY/PERMISSIVE DISTINCTION
Thirty-one years ago, in NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp.,' the United States Supreme Court ruled that all legal collective bargaining subjects could be divided into two categories: mandatory subjects upon which either party could insist to the point of impasse; 2 and permissive subjects about which the parties could choose to bargain but upon which they could not insist as a condition of agreement. 3 This decision empowered the National Labor Relations Board and the federal courts to influence the negotiating priorities and substantive bargaining positions of the parties through delineation of the topics upon which neither party could insist. In so ruling, the Court disregarded the National Labor Relations Act's 4 underlying premise of free collective bargaining and significantly altered the collective bargaining process. In essence, Borg-Warner al-lowed the administrative and judicial process to propound its own negotiating position at the bargaining table.
The Borg-Warner holding precipitated an immediate debate among commentators over the feasibility of this mandatory/permissive distinction. 5 Congress and the Supreme Court, however, ignored the criticism. Since then, discussion has centered on which bargaining topics should be labeled mandatory and which permissive. 6 Nowhere has this debate been more animated than in the area of an employer's major operational decisions -partial plant closings, relocations, automation, subcontracting, and so forth. Because these decisions usually involve important capital expenditures by employers and often directly affect the job security of employees, commentators have spiritedly advanced various tests and rules for determining whether bargaining over major operational decisions should be mandatory or permissive. 7 This Note, in contrast, contends that such line-drawing between bargaining topics is inherently inadequate because it fails to account for the specific needs and concerns present in an individual bargaining relationship. Instead, the solution to the contentious dispute over the categorization of major operational decisions, and more generally to all arguments over the labeling of bargaining topics, lies in the elimination of the mandatory/permissive distinction. Removing the distinction would allow individual unions and employers to decide for themselves which bargaining topics are essential to a mutually beneficial agreement.
Part I of the Note analyzes the legislative history of the duty to bargain. Part II then describes current law on the mandatory/permissive distinction. It focuses on major operational decisions because of the extensive dispute surrounding their categorization and because of their importance to both employees and employers. Part III then offers specific criticisms of the mandatory/permissive distinction. It concludes that neither recategorization nor rebalancing will redress the problems with the current law on operational decisions. Instead, it contends that the underlying theory of the NLRA, principles of freedom of contract, and sound labor policy all argue for legislative reform 5 See, e.g., Cox, Labor (1958) .
6 See generally I THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 2, at 772-869 (reviewing case law and selected scholarship categorizing mandatory, permissive, and illegal bargaining subjects).
'973 eliminating the mandatory/permissive distinction. In its place, Part IV proposes that a single, global duty of good faith should govern the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Congress enacted the Wagner Act in 1935 in an effort to combat the country's industrial unrest and economic woes. 8 The Act aimed to reconstruct the labor market by remedying the existing "inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full free-")9
dom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers .... To remedy the perceived inequalities between capital and labor, section 7 of the Act granted employees three basic rights -the right to organize, the right to bargain as a collective, and the right to peaceful use of economic weapons to extract concessions from employers.' 0 Congress believed that these rights would provide unions with sufficient bargaining power to negotiate acceptable terms of employment. 11 Congress did not intend, however, to preclude or inhibit free bargaining' 2 within this reconstructed setting. As Senator Walsh,
Chairman of the Senate Education and Labor Committee, stated:
When the employees have chosen their organization, when they have selected their representatives, all the bill proposes to do is to escort them to the door of their employer and say, "Here they are, the legal (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) ) ("The denial by employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest .... "); see also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. i, 42 (1937) (noting that the right to self-organization is "often an essential condition of industrial peace'). 9 National Labor Relations Act § i, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449, 449 (i935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § i5I (1982) ); see also Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 45.
10 Section 7 of the Act provided: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." National Labor Relations Act § 7, Pub. 1357, 1357 (1983) ("My conclusion is that [the NLRA] is in large measure a mistake that, if possible, should be scrapped in favor of the adoption of a sensible common law regime relying heavily upon tort and contract law."). This Note neither disputes nor promotes this contention. Rather, it accepts the basic § 7 rights, see supra note 1o, as given and argues for a preservation of free bargaining within that reconstructed sphere.
representatives of your employees." What happens behind those doors is not inquired into, and the bill does not seek to inquire into it.
13
While Congress did not intend to prescribe the substance or scope of bargaining, it did intend that bargaining occur. Thus, although the bill as originally introduced only implied a duty to bargain, 14 Congress later made that duty explicit in section 8(5). 15 Recognizing that this duty to bargain implied a good faith effort to reach an agreement 16 and that the enforcement of the duty could interfere with the bargaining process, Senator Wagner clarified the scope of section
8(5):
Most emphatically this provision does not imply governmental supervision of wage or hour agreements. It does not compel anyone to make a compact of any kind if no terms are arrived at that are satisfactory to him. The very essence of collective bargaining is that either party shall be free to withdraw if its conditions are not met. 17 Thus, although the implied duty to bargain in good faith was in tension with the Act's general refusal to supervise the bargaining process,' 8 REc. 7648, 7650 (1935) s See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 486 (i96o) ("Obviously there is tension between the principle that the parties need not contract on any specific terms and a practical enforcement of the principle that they are bound to deal with each other in a serious attempt to resolve differences and reach a common ground."); see also Smith, The Evolution of the "Duty To Bargain" Concept in American Law, 39 MICH. L. REv. io65, zo87-88 (1941) (describing free bargaining and the good faith requirement as "patently inconsistent concepts').
19 Congress intended the good faith determination to be subjective and limited in scope. Indeed, in 1947, because of concerns that the Board was using the good faith analysis to inquire into the substance of various collective bargaining agreements, 20 Congress sought to define the scope of the duty to bargain.
2 1 Initially, the House sought to require negotiation on only five specific categories of bargaining topics.
2 2 In amending the bill, however, the Senate eliminated the House's detailed enumeration and substituted the general language that became section 8(d), which defines collective bargaining as negotiating in good faith "with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."
23 Upon accepting the Senate's version, the House Conference Report stated:
[T]he Senate amendment, while it did not prescribe a purely objective test of what constituted collective bargaining, as did the House bill, had to a very substantial extent the same effect as the House bill in this regard, since it rejected, as a factor in determining good faith, the test of making a concession and thus prevented the Board from determining the merits of the positions of the parties.
24
In context, section 8(d) should thus be seen as a response to the Board's departure from the free bargaining principle of the Wagner Act. Defining the scope of bargaining was intended to enhance bargaining freedom rather than diminish it. However, Congress' requirement that parties negotiate certain minimum subjects offered a secondbest solution at odds with the broader free bargaining premises of the Act. The solution was inadequate because its listing of "mandatory" negotiating subjects allowed for some continued substantive interference with free bargaining. Thus, while this Note focuses on the problems created by Borg-Warner's misinterpretation of section 8(d) as creating mandatory and permissive subjects, it also advocates amendment of that portion of section 8(d) which defines mandatory bargaining subjects. Section 8(d)'s departure from the Act's underlying premise, while unfortunate, certainly did not compel the much more intrusive interference with free bargaining of the mandatory/permissive dichotomy. 2 5 Indeed, the legislative pronouncements surrounding section 8(d) and the Act's clearly expressed purpose of avoiding inquiry into the substantive positions of the negotiating parties, suggest quite the opposite. 2 6 The clear weight of the NLRA's history and its free-bargaining ethos suggests that the mandatory/permissive distinction rests on tenuous legislative footing, and thus casts doubt on the current state of the law and warrants an inspection of alternatives. Before evaluating alternative proposals or taking up the argument for elimination of the mandatory/permissive distinction, however, this Note reviews the state of the law in order to give context to and highlight the need for the Note's proposal. 285 (1956) (concluding that when interpreting the NLRA the Court "'must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy'") (quoting United States v. Boisdor6's Heirs, 49 U.S. (8 How.) iI3, 122 (185o)); id. at 293 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("In a word, enactments like the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Act must be considered as an organic whole.").
II. THE STATE OF THE LAW
27 In Borg-Warner, the employer insisted that the collective bargaining agreement include: a "recognition" clause which recognized only the local union and excluded the international union that the Board had certified, and a "ballot" clause that required the employees to vote on the employer's last offer before proceeding with any strike. The Court held that these subjects fell outside of § 8(d) and were therefore nonmandatory. See 356 U.S. at 344-50. 28 Writing in dissent, Justice Harlan advocated such an interpretation. He reasoned:
The Act sought to compel management and labor to meet and bargain in good faith as to certain topics. This is the affirmative requirement of § 8(d) which the Board is specifically empowered to enforce, but I see no warrant for inferring from it any power in the Board to prohibit bargaining in good faith as to lawful matters not included in
It must not be forgotten that the Act requires bargaining, not agreement, for the obligation to bargain ".. . does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession." 356 U.S. at 357-58 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 61 Stat, 136, '977 vision expansively. It concluded that section 8(d)'s enumeration of mandatory good faith bargaining subjects prohibited insistence on "permissive" subjects outside its language, because such insistence was tantamount to a refusal to bargain about the mandatory subjects within 8(d). 29 In doing so, the Court failed to offer a normative argument for this interpretation of section 8(d); 30 instead, it simply purported to read the language of the statute to compel mandatory and permissive categories of bargaining topics.
The results of categorizing a subject mandatory or permissive are significant. Labeling a bargaining topic mandatory entitles either party to a good faith discussion of that subject; further, either party may insist to the point of impasse on the inclusion of its proposal in the agreement. 3 1 In addition, an employer may not institute a unilateral change in a term or condition of employment that is a mandatory subject of bargaining unless the parties have first bargained to impasse over the proposed change. 3 2 Finally, either side may use its Harlan's interpretation would, at least, have kept § 8(d)'s infringement of free bargaining to a minimum. Although it would still require the parties to negotiate about each subject within § 8(d), it would not force them to make concessions on such subjects, and would also leave them free to insist in good faith on permissive subjects.
29 See Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at 349. Contesting this reasoning, Justice Harlan argued that if a party could not insist on a permissive subject as a condition to agreement, then it could not truly bargain over that subject at all. See id. at 353 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
30 The Court's failure to articulate an underlying rationale is strange given the clear congressional purpose of avoiding substantive inspection of negotiating positions. If pressed for such a rationale, however, the Court might have articulated three concerns. First, it could have reiterated the Taft-Hartley Act's concern with the Board's abuse of good faith analysis. See supra note 20. The Court's solution, however, merely substitutes formal interference for discretionary interference. Cf. infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text (discussing the proper limited scope of good faith analysis). Second, the Court might have thought that reducing the number of bargaining subjects would reduce the number of impasse situations and thereby avoid industrial strife. See Comment, supra note 5, at 192. But see Cox, supra note 5, at io82 (suggestin that broadening the issues may sometimes actually increase the range of settlement possibilities). Finally, the Court might have feared that without limits on bargaining subjects, the stronger party would be able to usurp all the traditional functions of the weaker party. In fact, employers had expressed this concern. See Comment, supra note 5, at 192-93 (noting management's concern that unions might interfere with its traditional prerogatives) (citing CHAMBERLAIN, THE UNION CHALLENGE TO MANAGEMENT CONTROL 129- 42 (1948) ). This concern, however, goes to bargaining power, not bargaining subjects. 1962) . In Katz, the employer unilaterally implemented a new sick-leave plan, a substantial wage increase over what had been offered during negotiations, and merit increases. See id. at 741. The Court held that such unilateral changes in mandatory subjects amounted to a per se refusal to bargain in good faith. See id. at 747.
The Katz holding has not been applied to unions because of their relative inability to affect the terms and conditions of employment. See i THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 2, at 564-65. But see Associated Home Builders v. NLRB, 352 F.2d 745, 750 (9th Cir. i965) (holding that a union's unilateral imposition of production quotas, enforced by fines, could constitute a refusal to bargain about a mandatory subject).
economic weapons -a strike or lockout, for example -to encourage concession on a mandatory topic.
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Different results flow from denominating a subject permissive. First, neither party may insist on the inclusion of that subject in the agreement. 3 4 Although either party may seek discussion of a permissive topic, refusal by the other does not violate sections 8(a)(5) or 8(b)(3). 35 Thus, the use of economic weapons to secure concession on a permissive subject constitutes an unfair labor practice. Second, both employers and unions may make unilateral changes in permissive bargaining subjects without consulting the other party. The methodology for categorizing major operational decisions was originally articulated by Justice Stewart in his concurrence in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB. 3 7 Attempting to discern which 33 In this context, the question that arises is whether a union or employer must bargain to impasse before using its economic weapons. In NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (ig6o), during the course of negotiating a collective agreement, union members, among other tactics, refused to solicit new business and held half-day walkouts as part of a general work slowdown designed to exert pressure on the employer. See id. at 48o. The Supreme Court held that this activity did not necessitate a finding of bad faith.
While the Insurance Agents' holding would seem to apply to employers as well as unions, Katz's subsequent preclusion of employer unilateral action prior to impasse suggests otherwise. See supra note 32. Thus, an employer may not make unilateral changes during negotiations in an effort to encourage concession. Although facially inequitable, the relative inability of unions to effect unilateral changes in basic terms of employment justifies this result. See supra note
32.
An employer's use of a lockout, however, raises a different issue. Although a lockout is a "unilateral change," unions have a reciprocal ability to strike or slowdown under Insurance Agents'. Thus, the Board upheld the use of a pre-impasse lockout in Cir. 1969 187-88 (i971) . The ability to take unilateral action on permissive subjects is of great importance in the major operational decision context because most such decisions occur as unilateral changes. See infra pp. 3' 379 U.S. 203 (1964) . Fibreboard constituted the Supreme Court's first prominent statement on the scope of bargaining required of an employer seeking to make an operational change. The Court held that an employer's decision to subcontract a portion of its work performed by bargaining unit employees constituted a mandatory subject of bargaining. While limiting its holding to the type of subcontracting present in the case, see id. at 215, it hinted that every managerial decision that terminates employment may be a mandatory bargaining subject. See id. at 210 ("The words ['terms and conditions of employment' used in § 8(d)] plainly cover termination of employment.").
Worried about the "disturbing breadth" of the majority's holding, see id. at 218 (Stewart, J., concurring), Justice Stewart crafted his concurrence to curtail the holding's scope by delineating categories within which an employer had complete discretion to act. type of managerial decisions affecting job security fell within 8(d)'s "terms and conditions of employment" language, Justice Stewart distinguished three different types of bargaining topic's. 38 The first category consists of those subjects directly involving "conditions of employment" so as to lie securely within the parameters of section 8(d). Such mandatory subjects include seniority rights, freedom from discriminatory discharge, and mandatory retirement. Second are those decisions that have so indirect an effect on job security that they cannot be considered conditions of employment. Decisions about advertising, marketing, financing, product design, and so forth fall within this "permissive" category. Third, Justice Stewart enumerated a group of decisions that could imperil job security but that also concern significant capital investment or the scope of an enterprise. He concluded that within this category, those decisions "which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control" 39 ought not be subject to a mandatory bargaining requirement. Justice Stewart, however, did not define which subjects affecting job security fell within this area of "entrepreneurial control." Thus, his concurring opinion left unresolved the question of which major operational decisions constituted permissive subjects of bargaining.
The Supreme Court did not speak directly on this issue until its 1981 decision in First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB. 40 Confronted with an employer's decision to terminate one of its operations, 4 1 the Court used Justice Stewart's tripartite analysis 4 2 and adopted a balancing test to determine which subjects within Stewart's third category constitute decisions that lie "at the core of entrepreneurial control" and are therefore permissive. The Court stated that bargaining over decisions that have an impact on continued employment should be required "only if the benefit, for labor-management relations and the collective-bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business. 4 II] ,48 it ruled that bargaining over any topic within Justice Stewart's third category of management decisions is not required unless that decision "turns upon a reduction of labor costs." '49 The current framework thus not only makes an employer's partial closing decision per se permissive, but also makes permissive all other major operational decisions not motivated solely by labor costs. 50 Decisions that turn solely on labor costs will be rare. Management typically justifies and usually bases major decisions on a variety of grounds in order to emphasize their necessity. 47 See 29 U.S.C. § i56 (1982) . Section 6 of the Act states that "the Board shall have authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind ... such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act." Id.
48 269 N.L.R.B. 89r (1984) . The Board held that an employer's decision to relocate its research and development operation to a more modern facility was not a mandatory bargaining topic even though labor costs "may have been one of the circumstances which stimulated the evaluation process which generated the decision." Id. at 892. 51 See George, supra note 7, at 692. Indeed, the "turns on labor costs" test does not provide a union mu-ch more protection from the effects of unnegotiated major changes than that already available under the Supreme Court's decision in Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (I965). In Darlington, the Court held that although an employer has an absolute right to terminate his entire business for any reason he pleases, such a right does not extend to a partial closing motivated by anti-union animus. See id. at 274-75. Thus, under Darlington an employer may not relocate because he does not like the union, and under Otis Elevator 11, an employer may not relocate because he does not like the cost of the union. Any additional measure of protection for the union must indeed be slight.
52 But see infra p. 1984 (suggesting that unions may be able to accomplish such bargaining by subterfuge).
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[VOL. 102"I971 rive bargaining agreement. Unforeseen economic exigencies often require management to decide quickly whether to relocate or close a portion of a business. Thus, major operational decisions often arise as "unilateral changes" that an employer may make with impunity given the decisions' current classification as permissive subjects. The timing of such major operational decisions places unions in a double bind. A union may neither covertly insist on bargaining as part of a broader initial agreement that includes bargainable mandatory subjects, 5 3 nor may it exert economic pressure at the time of the change because the decision is deemed "permissive."
III. A CRITIQUE OF THE MANDATORY/PERMISSIVE DISTINCTION
The vigorous debate over the labeling of major operational decisions as mandatory or permissive topics arises from strong interests on both sides. From the employees' perspective, categorizing an operational decision as permissive produces a harsh outcome. Because such decisions usually result in temporary or permanent job loss, they affect employment in a more significant way than any adjustment of wages and hours; yet, employees may not insist on protection from such an action. Employers, however, may view such a categorization as appropriate. They can argue that major operational decisions go to the very heart of managerial prerogatives and that management has "great need for speed, flexibility, and secrecy in meeting business opportunities and exigencies." 5 4 Further, employers might contend that they have every incentive to confer with the union if labor costs are truly a factor in deciding on an operational change.
5
Certainly, more sophisticated arguments can be marshalled to support either the employees' or employers' perspective.
5 6 However, regardless of their sophistication or motivation, such arguments are inherently inadequate. They fail because they amount only to the best guess or most well-intentioned wish of courts or commentators 53 See infra p. 1984. A union, of course, can bargain in the initial agreement over the eventuality of a major operational change. However, the employer's lack of incentive to bargain over permissive subjects greatly diminishes the union's chances of success.
S4 First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 682-83. Employers, and apparently a majority of the Supreme Court, worry that categorizing major operational decisions as mandatory will simply provide unions with a "powerful tool for achieving delay" without creating any new hope SS See First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 682. 56 See, e.g., George, supra note 7 (developing a methodology for applying the First National Maintenance balancing test); Goldman, supra note 7, at io89 (2967) (arguing that employer decisions involving fixed capital should not require bargaining); Hedlund, supra note 7, at 950, 961-68 (arguing that a bargaining requirement for operational decisions would "enhance economic efficiency by promoting mutually beneficial exchange").
as to which bargaining topics employers and unions value most. Instead, these questions should be resolved by the parties themselves.
Rather than criticizing the current categorization of bargaining subjects, therefore, this Part critiques the mandatory/permissive distinction itself and argues for its elimination. The mandatory/permissive dichotomy's primary problem is that it distorts the bargaining process by allowing the Board and the courts to determine the scope of bargaining. In addition, its application diminishes creativity in bargaining relationships and encourages subterfuge in the negotiating process.
Allowing the Board and the courts to determine the scope of bargaining has a number of disadvantages. First, compared to the negotiating parties, the Board and the courts are ill-equipped to decide which subjects are necessary components of a collective bargaining agreement. Composed entirely of attorneys, 5 7 the Board's knowledge of industrial relations in general is inevitably incomplete; this shortcoming is only magnified when it deals with the peculiar needs of each workplace environment. 5 8 Furthermore, the judges who review the decisions of the Board usually have even less experience in industrial relations. 5 9 Second, leaving the determination of the scope of bargaining to the Board and the courts leaves the bargaining position of the parties to the vicissitudes of the electoral and appointment process rather than to the parties' respective bargaining strengths. The "proper" scope of bargaining fluctuates as the composition of the Board 60 or the Court changes. 6 1 Although changing judicial and administrative standards are not necessarily problematic, they are detrimental in this context. Achieving the most mutually beneficial bargaining agreement is far more likely when bargaining reflects the particular needs of 378-79 (1985) . Comparing judicial settlement to private arbitration, Professor Weiler states that "it would be difficult to choose an institution worse suited to grappling with difficult issues of work rules and employment conditions than a government agency like the NLRB." Id. at 379 (citation omitted).
59 Id. at 378. The Court's decision in First National Maintenance is particularly troubling in this regard. A balancing test that weighs an employer's need for entrepreneurial discretion against the benefits of the bargaining process merely replicates in the abstract the specific decision-making process of an employer familiar with his own particular industry. 60 The National Labor Relations Board consists of five members, appointed to staggered five-year terms by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. See 29 U.S.C. §
153(a) (1982).
61 The change in the law between Fibreboard and First National Maintenance, coinciding with a change in the composition of the Court, exemplifies this phenomenon. litical adjustments in the administrative and judicial process. 6 2 Third, and most importantly, categorizing bargaining subjects diminishes the parties' autonomy to bargain over those subjects that they deem most important. This effect not only promotes inefficient bargaining, but also conflicts with free contract and the premises underlying the NLRA. As discussed in Part I, the NLRA provided for free bargaining by reconstructing the labor market. It allowed employees to organize themselves 6 3 and then provided for free contracting between an employer and his employees as a group. 64 It entitled both sides to negotiate in good faith for those concessions that their collective bargaining power 65 could provide. By diminishing the autonomy of the parties, the mandatory/permissive distinction tends to stifle creativity in bargaining relationships. 66 When the Board or the Court determines whether a particular subject is mandatory or permissive, it freezes the allocation of responsibility between union and employer.
6 7 Furthermore, when it sets the 62 Indeed, political adjustment was not the result intended by the Wagner Act. In Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342 (I944), the Supreme Court stated: "Collective bargaining was not defined by the statute which provided for it, but it generally has been considered to absorb and give statutory approval to the philosophy of bargaining as worked out in the labor movement in the United States." Id. at 346. This command becomes somewhat circular when read in conjunction with § 8(d)'s delineation of required subjects of bargaining and Borg-Warner's expansion of the definitional analysis. If courts look to industry practice to determine the proper scope of bargaining, they may simply inspect practices mandated by previous decisions.
63 Under § 8(a)(2) of the Act, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization." 29 U.S.C. § I58(a)(2) (1982) .
64 Section 9(a) requires employers to bargain with the union and makes a union chosen by a majority of employees the exclusive representative of all employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982) .
6s Aside from its members' skills and demand for those skills in the workplace, a union's bargaining power is a function of "three basic elements: the right to strike, the ability to strike successfully, and the amount of loss which can be inflicted on the employer. 67 Advocates of the current regime might argue that the opportunity to seek bargaining over permissive subjects sufficiently promotes creativity. However, because one party can simply refuse to discuss any permissive topics, both parties may well remain uninformed about the possible value of different proposals. standard for one industry, it sets the standard for all industries, and thus inhibits individual employers and unions from negotiating the most mutually beneficial collective bargaining agreement. Such an agreement is much more likely to be obtained when bargaining decisions depend on the particular workplace needs and economic environment within an industry. For example, employees working in an area of the country with low unemployment and in an industry that requires easily transferable skills may not need to bargain for a provision prohibiting relocation. On the other hand, employees in an industry with high unemployment and limited mobility may feel that such a provision is essential. Unions and employers need freedom to find solutions amenable to their particular workplaces.
The current mandatory/permissive framework, furthermore, encourages subterfuge in the bargaining relationship. Unable to insist on a permissive subject legally, negotiators may attempt to force bargaining on non-mandatory topics sub silentio. 68 For example, a union negotiator could propose an unreasonably large wage increase in conjunction with a contractual provision prohibiting relocation. Then, while insisting that the relocation provision is not a precondition of agreement, the negotiator could carefully 69 hint that the union will insist on the wage increase to impasse so that it may use its economic weapons, unless the employer relents on the relocation provision. Thus subterfuge inhibits efficient bargaining. Because the parties must always avoid the appearance of insisting on a permissive subject, they may be unable to address forcefully the precise issues hindering agreement. 70 The treatment of most operational decisions as permissive subjects augments the potential for subterfuge. As the importance of a particular topic increases, negotiators are increasingly tempted to force their adversaries to bargain over that topic. Given the importance to employees of fundamental operational decisions, then, the incentive for subterfuge is great.
Despite its problems, the use of subterfuge often allows parties to insist on permissive topics and thus it creates a de facto bargaining 65 See Cox, supra note 5, at 1076-77 (discussing different tactics that a negotiator may employ in order to bargain on permissive subjects).
69 A negotiator would need to be "careful" because in a future unfair labor practice proceeding, the employer could use his statements as evidence to show that the union had in fact insisted on the permissive provision. See, e.g., Good GMC, Inc., 267 N.L.R.B. 583, 586-88 (1982) (opinion of administrative law judge concluding that "[c]onsideration of all surrounding circumstances indicates that [the employer] in effect insisted that the Union enter into a settlement [on a permissive subject] ... before it would sign the contract').
70 See Cox, supra note 5, at 1077. Professor Cox also suggests that subterfuge may lead to an inefficient use of economic weapons and provides an interesting example: "During the years in which the Massachusetts court held it unlawful to strike for a union shop, there were not many strikes upon that issue but a very considerable number of strikes for higher wages were settled as soon as the employer decided to grant a union shop agreement." Id. at 1077 n.64. regime that permits insistence on permissive subjects. This de facto bargaining process, however, lacks persuasive force as an argument for maintaining the current legal regime. Surely, the current law should not be maintained simply because it is ineffective. Indeed, if such de facto bargaining is truly widespread, 7 1 then eliminating the mandatory/permissive dichotomy would not significantly upset the expectations of the parties. Moreover, any failure of the current law to reflect the bargaining practices of employers and unions can only serve to delegitimize the Act as a whole.72
More importantly, the de facto ability to insist on bargaining is not complete. Neither party may use subterfuge when a mid-term unilateral change is made. Thus, in cases of major operational decisions, sub silentio insistence on bargaining often is not an option for a union. 7 3 Furthermore, the current regime denies those negotiators who are not clever enough to engage in subterfuge the same opportunities for bargaining. Likewise, negotiators should not be penalized for complying with the law for its own sake.
The foregoing critique suggests that the mandatory/permissive distinction is severely flawed in both concept and application and that The Board's decision in Good GMC, Inc., 267 N.L.R.B. 583 (1982) further enhances the ability to insist on permissive subjects. In Good GMC, a union signed an agreement accepting all of management's proposals except one permissive subject. See id. Management refused to agree without inclusion of the permissive subject and withdrew the entire contract. See id. at 583-84. Rejecting the administrative law judge's determination that this action amounted to insistence on a permissive subject, the Board held that an employer must be allowed to restructure the entire package in such situations. See id; see also Nordstrom, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 6oi (1977) (holding that one party cannot effectively close negotiations by simply agreeing to only the mandatory requests of the other party).
Finally, further de facto bargaining will occur because of the new plant closing law. Its requirement that an employer provide 6o days notice of plant closings and mass lay-offs will provide unions with significant time to demand bargaining over the effects of such changes. See Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act § 3(a), Pub. L. No. 100-379, 202 Stat. 890, 891-92 (2988) [hereinafter Plant Closing Law] . For a more detailed discussion of the plant closing law's effect on the workplace, see PLANT CLOSINGS: THE COMPLETE RESOURCE GUIDE (BNA Special Report 1988) .
72 In fact, the NLRA was specifically designed to take account of industrial bargaining practice in determining good faith. See supra note 62. It was created not to constrain the collective bargaining process but to "encourage" it. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) .
73 A union, of course, could use subterfuge during the negotiation of the initial agreement to force bargaining on contingent operational changes. 1989] change is warranted. Indeed, reform may be more compelling and acceptable now than when Borg-Warner was decided over thirty years ago. The Supreme Court's holding in First National Maintenance and the Board's subsequent broadening, under the Otis Elevator II standard, of those subjects within an employer's entrepreneurial control have focused and energized debate on the adverse consequences of the mandatory/permissive distinction. The categorization of major operational decisions highlights the inadequacies of the dichotomy because the stakes of that categorization are so high. In addition, thirty years and various changes in the personnel and philosophies of the Board and the Supreme Court, have taught both employers and unions of the potential dangers of the mandatory/permissive dichotomy. Whereas in Borg-Warner and Fibreboard unions were winners in the categorization struggle, of late they have been on the losing end of battles over the scope of bargaining. Although this pattern would appear to suggest that presently only unions would support change, that is not necessarily the case. Provident employers should recognize that a differently constituted Board or Court could decide to recategorize currently permissive subjects.
IV. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS
Three alternative bargaining regimes could replace the current mandatory/permissive dichotomy. First, the law could require good faith bargaining as to each proposal advanced by management or union. Second, following Justice Harlan's dissent in 74 the Court could reinterpret section 8(d) to require good faith discussion of each subject within the language of 8(d) and to allow insistence on subjects outside 8(d)'s terms. Third, as this Note advocates, the law could simply require overall good faith bargaining.
The first proposal would eliminate the mandatory/permissive distinction by, in effect, making all subjects mandatory. 75 It would require each party to discuss in good faith any issue that the other chose to present. A party would be required to use its bargaining power only to gain a concession. Likewise, in the midterm unilateral change context, an employer would be required to bargain with the union over any change the union desired to discuss. 74 See supra note 28 (discussing Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion). 75 Professor Archibald Cox advanced this approach soon after Borg-Warner. See Cox, supra note 5, at io86. He suggested that the Court should broadly interpret the "terms or conditions of employment" language of § 8(d) so as to include every subject which management or labor might advance that was "not inconsistent with a federal statute or declared public policy." Id.;
see also H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 68-82 (1968) (advocating a similar interpretation of § 8(d)).
The second proposal would guarantee each party good faith discussion of all subjects within the terms of section 8(d), and on those subjects would require each to use its bargaining power only to gain concessions. Each could also use its bargaining power to obtain both discussion and concession on any topic outside the terms of 8(d). Thus, both parties could insist to impasse on any subject. In the midterm unilateral change context, a union could obtain good faith discussion of all 8(d) subjects.
Both the first and second proposals would be an improvement over the current regime. By allowing employers and employees to press for any issue that they deem important, the proposals would encourage creativity and avoid the problems of subterfuge. Both options, however, have flaws. The first proposal would likely prove time-consuming and costly. The ability to force good faith negotiation on any subject would give both parties an incentive to put forward proposals on numerous topics in the hope that discussion might lead to compromise or concession on each issue. Although the proposing party will have countervailing incentives to conserve its own time and to avoid concession elsewhere in the agreement, these countervailing concerns will have less influence in the context of midterm unilateral action. Because bargaining on a midterm change would not require any concession in the existing collective bargaining agreement, 76 a party has an incentive to demand bargaining on a midterm change whenever delay would be beneficial. Thus, a union might well bargain over a managerial decision which it would have readily conceded to the employer's discretion during the negotiation of the initial agreement.
A more significant problem with both regimes is that they conflict with free contract norms and the broader premises of the NLRA. Although certainly to a lesser degree than the current regime, both proposals would diminish the autonomy of the negotiating parties. The first proposal requires both sides to discuss each subject advanced by the other party. Thus, even if a party bargained in complete good faith, it could not refuse to discuss a particular topic. Similarly, the second proposal requires discussion of particular subjects -those within section 8(d). Not only does this diminish bargaining autonomy, but it has the added disadvantage of requiring continued judicial and administrative delineation of subjects that fall within 8(d).
These proposals might retain one attraction: by implementing them as an administrative or judicial matter, reformers could avoid the risk of a negative legislative outcome. The Court either could read 8(d)'s "terms and conditions of employment" language so expansively as to make all subjects mandatory, 77 or it could simply return to Justice 76 A union might choose, however, to make concessions in the existing agreement.
77 See supra note 75 (discussing such an alternative).
Harlan's Borg-Warner dissent. Judicial reform, however, would wreak havoc on the principle of stare decisis. The removal of the vast accretion of law built upon Borg-Warner goes beyond the role of the judiciary.78 More importantly, judicial reform would leave in place section 8(d)'s misconceived delineation of required subjects of collective bargaining. Although judicial reform within the framework of 8(d) is possible, it would be an insufficient affirmation of free collective bargaining and the broader theory of the NLRA.
Rather than requiring union and employer to bargain in good faith over every issue advanced by the opposing party, the NLRA, specifically section 8(d), should be amended to make explicit one of its underlying premises: unions and employers should be required to bargain in good faith -nothing more and nothing less. Each party should be allowed to insist on discussion of or to refuse to discuss any subject 79 as long as that party bargains more generally in good faith toward the attainment of a collective bargaining agreement. 8 0 Under this scheme, each side would allocate its bargaining power to those issues that it counted most important. Thus, for example, a union could insist on a contractual provision prohibiting relocation and encourage discussion and concession by taking tough positions on other issues or exerting economic pressure. Likewise, an employer could insist on discretion over relocation decisions.
This proposal might appear to make all subjects permissive, but it does not. Current law forbids a party to insist on a permissive subject to the point of impasse and to use its economic weapons to encourage concession on that subject. The proposed regime, however, leaves a party free to insist on any subject to impasse and to use its economic weapons to encourage concession.
The good faith standard envisioned under the proposal is a subjective test of whether a party is willing to reach an agreement. 8 1 Although the scope of this Note precludes a detailed analysis of good 81 See supra note I9 (discussing the meaning of good faith).
faith 8 2 and the remedies for its violation, 8 3 it is essential that the good faith inquiry be limited 8 4 and that it not look to the bargaining positions of the parties; otherwise, that inquiry may provide a means for continued interference with the substantive scope of bargaining.
8 5
Good faith does not mean "good deal." In the end, a party's success in the negotiation process must be determined by its possession and use of bargaining power. This emphasis on bargaining power will likely cause the greatest concern to critics of the proposal. If employers and unions can use their bargaining power to force negotiation and concession on currently permissive topics, then strong employers and strong unions may be able to gain concessions in areas formerly reserved to the other party. Thus, a strong employer could insist upon contract provisions dealing with internal union matters, and a strong union could co-opt the traditional prerogatives of management such as marketing, product design, and capital expenditures. Although employers, in general, may have more to fear from the proposal because they currently have (1958) .
8 Under current law, the usual remedy for refusing to bargain in good faith is merely an order to return to the table and start bargaining in good faith. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, io8 & n.5 (970) (refusing to grant a remedy ordering an employer to agree to a specific term in an agreement); cf. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 610-15 (1969) (discussing the Board's power to issue a so-called "bargaining order").
The good faith inquiry may have more significance in the context of a strike. Under the present regime, if a union engages in an economic strike, the employer may hire permanent replacements. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) . If, however, the Board finds that the strike is in response to an employer's unfair labor practice -a refusal to bargain in good faith, for example -it may order reinstatement of the striking employees even if that reinstatement displaces the replacement workers. See In re Brown Shoe Co., i N.L.R.B.
(936).
84 See, e.g., White v. NLRB, 255 F.2d 564 (Sth Cir. 1958) (upholding an employer's insistence on a broad management functions clause). In White, the court suggested that the good faith bargaining obligation was satisfied as long as the employer was "willing to reduce [some agreement] to writing and sign it." Id. at 566.
85 Although the good faith bargaining obligation necessarily limits free contract in the sense that a party cannot choose not to contract, see supra note 18 and accompanying text, the interference should not go beyond the basic requirement that a party be willing to reach some agreement. See supra note 84.
Still, critics of the proposal might argue that any good faith inquiry will allow the Board to return to its pre-Taft-Hartley practice of invading the substance of agreements through the interpretation of good faith. See supra note 2o. Even setting aside this Note's emphasis on a limited inquiry, § 8(d)'s explicit statement that good faith bargaining "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession," 29 U.S.C. § I58(d) (1982), decreases this possibility. See also H.K. Porter, 397 U.S. 99. As a practical matter, because a "bargaining order" or reinstatement is the usual remedy, see supra note 83, even a stringent good faith analysis would not preclude the eventual resolution of agreements by the parties themselves. more areas within their discretion, they also will generally have greater bargaining power with which to protect their interests. 8 6 Thus, free bargaining will not systematically advantage or disadvantage either party. Furthermore, while the concern over bargaining power has validity, it is not a fear that supports either legislative or judicial intervention to determine the scope of bargaining. Rather than simply limiting the subjects over which unequal bargaining occurs and suffering the attendant decrease in creativity and autonomy, a better solution, if necessary, would be to reallocate bargaining weapons. 8 7 Such reform would accord with the NLRA's design of providing the parties with sufficient bargaining power, and then allowing them to use that power as they see fit.
An overall obligation to bargain in good faith would succeed where the mandatory/permissive distinction fails and would constitute sound labor policy. First, it would encourage the development of creative collective bargaining agreements by allowing employers and employees to bargain over new workplace roles and responsibilities with reference to their particular skills and desires. 8 8 In order for American industry to succeed in increasingly competitive world markets, the law should facilitate new divisions of responsibility between employer and union that take advantage of the peculiar goals and challenges facing each industry.
Second, an overall obligation to bargain in good faith would eliminate the incentive to engage in subterfuge. 8 9 Neither side would need to make unacceptable proposals of a "mandatory" topic simply to retain the ability to use its economic weapons when it could not obtain 86 See Weiler, supra note 58 at 385-404 (arguing that the current allocation of economic weapons skews bargaining power in favor of employers). While unions are not by any means universally weak, the declining percentage of unions in the American workforce, see id. at 351 & n.2 (noting that the "unionized share of the workforce [was in 1984] about half of what it was just a quarter of a century ago"), suggests that they frequently have less bargaining power than employers.
87 For a thorough discussion of the current allocation of bargaining weapons, see Weiler, cited above in note 58, at 405. See also id. at 412-I9 (advocating reforms such as the elimination of permanent replacements for strikers and limited use of secondary boycotts for non-organizational purposes).
88 An overall good faith regime would facilitate joint labor-management efforts. It might, for example, increase the prevalence of agreements such as the one undertaken by the UAW and the GM-Toyota joint venture at New United Motors Manufacturing, Inc. in Fremont, California. See generally Schlossberg & Fetter, supra note 66, at 596-97. In their collective bargaining agreement, management and union agreed to share the "risk, responsibility, and reward of partnership." Id. at 596 (emphasis in original) (quoting Letter from Bruce Lee, Region 6 Director, UAW, to the Members of Local 2244 (June 1985) ). Prior to the negotiation of this new agreement, daily absenteeism was over 20 percent and more than a thousand grievances were pending; after the agreement, the same work force's absenteeism averaged about two percent and grievances were minimal. See id. at 596-97. 89 Of course, the regime would not, and is not intended to, eliminate the posturing and puffery typical of any negotiation. concession on a "permissive" topic. Thus, instead of promoting secrecy, the regime would promote clarity and sharing of information.
Both sides would have an incentive to delineate carefully a hierarchy of demands so that bargaining on primary issues of dispute could commence rapidly. If an impasse in negotiations did occur, both sides would have an accurate picture of the other's position and could thereby make informed use of their economic weapons. Thus the regime might diminish the number of fruitless strikes.
90
As suggested above, these two positive effects of an overall good faith bargaining requirement would also result from a requirement to bargain on each subject advanced by a negotiating party. However, the global good faith requirement is superior for two reasons. First, its application in the unilateral change context is less costly. Under the proposed global good faith bargaining regime, both sides satisfy their duty to bargain by executing an initial agreement in good faith. 9 1
They are then free, subject to their contractual obligations under the collective agreement, to take unilateral action during the term of the agreement.92 Although the cost of negotiating the initial agreement may increase -because both parties will want to negotiate for future contingencies as well as present needs -significant savings would result. Not only would it save time and money not to require bargaining over a unilateral change whenever requested, 93 but there would also be efficiency gains from allowing employers to take quick, decisive unilateral action when expedient.
90 See supra note 70 (discussing potential for inefficient use of the strike weapon under the current regime). Critics of the proposal might argue that it would increase industrial strife if parties could insist to impasse on any issue. However, providing more subjects about which employers and unions may bargain, will, in some instances, create wider opportunity for compromise. See Cox & Dunlop, supra note 8o, at 427. Furthermore, if employers and unions do not highly value bargaining over "permissive" subjects, then the elimination of the mandatory/ permissive distinction will not significantly widen the scope of bargaining. When it does, however, the law should not prevent the party committed to a subject from pressing for its inclusion in a collective bargaining agreement.
91 The duty to bargain in a posture of overall good faith should not preclude a union from using unilateral change as a method of exerting economic pressure on the employer during bargaining. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (i96o) (discussed at note 33 above). Such unilateral action would simply be another factor in the overall good faith analysis. Likewise, the employer could institute a pre-impasse lockout. See supra note 33.
92 But cf. Plant Closing Law, supra note 71, § 3(a), at 891-92 (requiring 6o days notice of plant closings and mass lay-offs).
Courts have promulgated different interpretations of whether bargaining is required during the term of an existing agreement. Compare Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 746, 751 (6th Cir. 1963 ) (concluding that if a subject is discussed and rejected during bargaining of an initial agreement, later bargaining on that subject is foreclosed), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 971 (1964) with NLRB v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 68o, 684 (2d Cir. 1952) (holding that an employer must bargain about "subjects which were neither discussed nor embodied in any of the terms and conditions of the contract").
93 Of course, a party could agree to bargain about the change.
Despite the cost savings, however, critics might contend that economic efficiency should not outweigh the employees' need to bargain over major unilateral decisions such as plant relocations or closings, and that, therefore, a good faith discussion requirement should attach to every subject. Such a requirement, however, would diminish bargaining autonomy and undermine the integrity of the initial bargaining agreement. The negotiation of that initial agreement -where the parties were not precluded from bargaining about any subjectconstitutes consent to unilateral action on subjects not addressed therein. Because each party is free to negotiate for control over any subject, its failure to preserve the right to bargain over future contingencies fairly implies consent. 94 Thus, the parties should not be required to bargain over midterm decisions unless negotiated otherwise in the initial collective bargaining agreement.
Finally, and more importantly, the good faith proposal is superior because it more closely comports with principles of free contract and the theory behind the NLRA. Unlike the other proposals that require bargaining on specific subjects, each side maintains its autonomy to discuss or not to discuss and to agree or not to agree on any issue. A party that finds discussion or concession on a bargaining topic particularly important will concede on other topics or institute a work stoppage to realize its demands. In essence, the proposal requires the government to remain outside the office door.
V. CONCLUSION
Labor reform eliminating the mandatory/permissive distinction is necessary. Returning to the underlying premises of the NLRA, that reform should consist of a single, global duty to bargain in good faith. Such a rule provides the solution to the current dispute over the categorization of major operational decisions by allowing unions and employers to decide for themselves whether bargaining over such decisions is essential. More generally, it would increase bargaining creativity and decrease the subterfuge common in current bargaining practice. Most importantly, it would comport with the spirit of the NLRA and allow free collective bargaining, and thereby increase the autonomy of both employers and unions. 94 Unions may be reluctant to bargain over future contingencies because to do so would require giving up present benefits. However, the reverse may be true for employers. In either event, the parties, and not the courts or Congress, should make that decision.
